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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL VENUE-WAIVER BY STATE NON-RESIDENT
MOTOR STATUTES
Resident of Iowa sued resident of North Carolina in a federal
district court in Pennsylvania for damages resulting from an
automobile accident which occurred in Pennsylvania. Held (2-1):
Venue was lacking because non-resident defendant's use of state
highways did not constitute waiver of 28 U. S. C. § 1391(a) pro-
viding that suit in federal court, based solely on diversity of
citizenship, may be brought only where either plaintiff or defend-
ant resides. McCoy v. Siler, 205 F. 2d 498 (3d Cir. 1953).
The weight of judicial opinion has been that a motorist is
deemed to waive the personal privilege conferred by the federal
venue statute when he subjects himself to a state non-resident
motorist statute through his act of driving on state highways.
Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 201 F. 2d 583 (6th Cir. 1953),
cert. granted, 345 U. S. 950 (1953) ; Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co.,
109 F. Supp. 556 (W. D. Pa. 1953); Archambeau v. Emerson, 108
F. Supp. 28 (D. C. Vt. 1952). Contra: Martin v. Fischbach Truck-
ing Co., 183 F. 2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950); Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F.
Supp. 651 (E. D. Tenn. 1950).
The argument that a state non-resident motorist statute can
effect waiver of the federal venue privilege is based on analogy
from Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165
(1939). 'There, the corporate defendant had appointed an agent
to receive process in compliance with statutory requirements gov-
erning foreign corporations doing business in New York. By so
acting, it was held, the corporation waived its rights under the
applicable federal venue statute and consented to suit in a federal
court in New York.
In the Neirbo case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said at 175, quot-
ing Ex Parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 377 (1877):
In finding an actual consent by Bethlehem to be sued in the
courts of New York, federal as well as state, we are not sub-
jecting federal procedure to the requirements of New York
law. We are recognizing that "state legislation and consent
of parties may bring about a state of facts which will author-
ize the courts of the United States to take cognizance of a
case."
For the corporation, the "state legislation" was the statute;
the "consent of parties" was the express appointment of the
agent; the "state of facts" was the doing of business in New York.
RECENT DECISIONS
Reasoning from the Neirbo case to the non-resident motorist:
The "state legislation" is the non-resident motorist statute, and
the "consent" is the use of state highways, from which is inferred
consent to the appointment of an agent for service of process.
In the Neirbo case there was an express written appointment,
which does not appear in the motorist cases. But consent has
been implied from merely "doing business." Knott Corp. v. Fur-
nan, 163 F. 2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947). However, earlier cases have
contended that the distinction between express and implied con-
sent explicitly recognized in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., supra at 173 n. 15, is crucial. Robinson v. Coos Bay Pulp
Corp., 147 F. 2d 512 (3d Cir. 1945); Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 149 F. 2d 701 (2d Cir. 1945); Cummer-Graham Co. v.
Straight Side Basket Corp., 136 F. 2d 828 (9th Cir. 1943).
In any event, the isolated act of driving within a state creates
the "minimum contact" necessary to sustain the applicability of
a statute giving state courts jurisdiction over the motorist.
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U. S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
However, it does not bring about a state of facts analogous to that
ascribed to a corporation found to be doing business within a
state. To characterize driving as "doing business" is to employ
an obviously illfitting metaphor.
If, then, it is not the "state of facts" which authorizes federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction, but the state law itself, this would
be in clear contravention of the rule in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64 (1938). For although federal courts must conform
to state substantive law, this does not extend to procedural rules
such as venue, over which the federal government has exclusive
regulatory power. Blunda v. Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E. D. Ho.
1947); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115 (1915); Foote v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 92 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir. 1937).
It is submitted that public policy should allow suits in federal
courts for torts committed by non-resident motorists. Interstate
automobile travel is no longer an isolated adventure, and to pro-
hibit suit in federal court for torts committed thereby is unrealis-
tic. But in view of the explicit language of the federal venue
statute, legislative action is required.
Morton Mendelsohn
The issues involved here have recently been resolved by the United States Supreme
Court in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 22 U. S. L. Week 4008 (U. S., Nov. 9,
1953). Distinguishing the Neirbo case on the ground that it referred to an express
consent not found here, the court concluded that to find an actual waiver of federal
venue rights on the part of a inotorist who never consented to anything "is surely to move
in the world of Alice in Wonderland," and held that venue was lacking under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1391 (a).
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